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the principle participants in the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, and identify any relevant lessons for contemporary commanders)

Order Description
(Analyse at the operational level the planning and prosecution of the campaigns waged by the principle participants in the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, and identify any relevant lessons for contemporary commanders)

The essay must be 4000 words including footnote and Bibliography doesn’t account. 10% interdiction 80% main body %10 conclusion.

Interdiction
Main body:
1. Background about the war and who were the principle participants
2. Analyse the operational level the planning of all of them:
• where Strategic and Political objectives are turned into tactical activity – the bridge between strategy and tactics
3. Analyse the prosecution of the copaigns waged of them:
• What were the main planning assumptions? How were the campaigns fought? What were the strengths and weaknesses in the planning and prosecution? Particularly; how well were strategic objectives translated into tactical action?.
4. Any relevant Lessons for cotemporary commanders:
• Identify’ List these lessons and explain why they’re important.
• ‘Suitable Lessons’ These should be lessons that are general, not only relevant to the specific case, and useful for different conflicts.
• ‘Contemporary Commander’ The commander of today.
Conclusion Looks back to the question and draws together the key strands of your CORE ARGUMENT; identifies the wider implications (where appropriate); does not bring in any new information; does not make recommendations.
Reference; (add more 10 reverences the required is bettwen 13-16 reverancees)
1. Strategic Surprise or Fundamental Flaws? The Sources of Israel’s … Bar-Joseph, Uri The Journal of Military History; Apr 2008; 72, 2; ProQuest Research Librarypg. 509-530
2. Perception, Misperception and Surprise in the Yom Kippur War: A Look at the New Evidence by Abraham Ben-Zvi . 3. Bregmman – War and peace.103-144
4. An Autocracy at War: Explaining Egypt’s Military Effectiveness, 1967 and 1973 RISA BROOKS.
5. The Soviets were just an excuse’: why Israel did not destroy the Egyptian
Third Army Talia Winokur P60-74

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the principle participants in the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, and identify any relevant lessons for contemporary commanders)

Order Description
(Analyse at the operational level the planning and prosecution of the campaigns waged by the principle participants in the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, and identify any relevant lessons for contemporary commanders)

The essay must be 4000 words including footnote and Bibliography doesn’t account. 10% interdiction 80% main body %10 conclusion.

Interdiction
Main body:
1. Background about the war and who were the principle participants
2. Analyse the operational level the planning of all of them:
• where Strategic and Political objectives are turned into tactical activity – the bridge between strategy and tactics
3. Analyse the prosecution of the copaigns waged of them:
• What were the main planning assumptions? How were the campaigns fought? What were the strengths and weaknesses in the planning and prosecution? Particularly; how well were strategic objectives translated into tactical action?.
4. Any relevant Lessons for cotemporary commanders:
• Identify’ List these lessons and explain why they’re important.
• ‘Suitable Lessons’ These should be lessons that are general, not only relevant to the specific case, and useful for different conflicts.
• ‘Contemporary Commander’ The commander of today.
Conclusion Looks back to the question and draws together the key strands of your CORE ARGUMENT; identifies the wider implications (where appropriate); does not bring in any new information; does not make recommendations.
Reference; (add more 10 reverences the required is bettwen 13-16 reverancees)
1. Strategic Surprise or Fundamental Flaws? The Sources of Israel’s … Bar-Joseph, Uri The Journal of Military History; Apr 2008; 72, 2; ProQuest Research Librarypg. 509-530
2. Perception, Misperception and Surprise in the Yom Kippur War: A Look at the New Evidence by Abraham Ben-Zvi . 3. Bregmman – War and peace.103-144
4. An Autocracy at War: Explaining Egypt’s Military Effectiveness, 1967 and 1973 RISA BROOKS.
5. The Soviets were just an excuse’: why Israel did not destroy the Egyptian
Third Army Talia Winokur P60-74

Responses are currently closed, but you can trackback from your own site.

Comments are closed.

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