ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS IN DETAIL: ONE PAGE EACH
Paisley Livingston’s (2008) paper ‘Theses on cinema as philosophy’ seems to articulate two interpretations of the thesis that films can do, or be, philosophy: (i) the weaker thesis that films can play a supportive role in illuminating or exemplifying philosophical arguments—they serve as a ‘resource’—or (ii) as the bolder thesis that films can make independent, innovative, and substantial contributions to philosophy by means unique to the cinematic medium. It is this latter, bold thesis that Livingston denies. Firstly, explain why Livingston denies the bold thesis. Secondly—and much more importantly—articulate what you think Livingston would say about the short 1981 film from Dennett et al., entitled Where am I? Does the Dennett movie vindicate Livingston’s views, demonstrating why the bold thesis is false? Or does the film Where am I? provide an example of how films can do or be philosophy? Explain in detail, analyzing Where am I? where needed.
In most philosophical discussions of (declarative) knowledge, the point of departure is often an insistence on the fundamental distinction between appearance and reality. Usually, some combination of lessons are then trotted out to illuminate the epistemic problems that this distinction causes: e.g., Plato’s allegory of the cave, Descartes’s evil demon-and-dream hypotheses, and Putnam’s brain-in-a-vat thought experiment, etc. These stories and thought experiments are supposed to raise the specter of global skepticism about our empirical knowledge of what is real. One of the movies that seems to best exemplify this train of thought is Lana (née Larry) & Lilly (née Andy) Wachowski’s movie, The Matrix. For example, it’s conceivable—and therefore possible—that we are, unbeknownst to us, stuck in a matrix-like simulation. Okay, fine. But how, exactly, does this movie exemplify this combination of stories; in particular, how does The Matrix engage with Putnam’s concerns about the very possibility of having empirical knowledge of reality? Having now re-read Putnam’s famous paper and Grau’s discussion of his argument for the conclusion that the very supposition of being a brain-in-a-vat is self-refuting, how do you think Putnam’s argument applies to The Matrix? Or does it even apply at all? Explain and develop your answer in detail.

. In the Wachowski’s The Matrix, the character played by Joe Pantoliano (‘Cypher’) decides to abandon his unpleasant actual life in order to be permanently inserted into the Matrix. After viewing clips of the movie, we described and discussed in class a thought experiment—Robert Nozick’s so-called ‘Experience Machine’ thought experiment, which is also discussed in Christopher Grau’s chapter—that is similar to the idea of being a brain-in-a-vat. The main difference is that, in the Experience Machine or in The Matrix, one has full authority to determine any/all aspects of one’s experiences (content, duration, quality, valence, etc.). The decision to plug in is irreversible, and the experiences will of course be artificially contrived and somewhat inauthentic. Should we all plug in? Are there any considerations that ought to deter us from doing so? In particular, what’s so valuable about having experiences that are authentic? Isn’t real life full of tedia, misery, boredom, long lines at the grocery checkout, phone bills, estranged relationships, et cetera? Granted, in real life, the desire for authenticity might be a worthwhile endeavor; however, in real life, we are never confronted by the choice to plug in to the Experience Machine. If we were so confronted, though, shouldn’t we all give up on authenticity? What’s so good about living an ordinary life that goes at most only moderately well most days? Does Grau’s chapter, ‘Bad dreams, evil demons, and the experience machine’ provide any persuasive reasons why none of us should decide to plug in?