nature of “rights”

YOU MUST READ THE READINGS
The readings are:
1- Locke, Of the State of Nature.
2- Hegel, Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness.
3- King, Letter from Birmingham Jail.
Reading are attached. And I will know if you have read them or not from the information because I have read them myself.
What is the nature of “rights”?
You should be able to demonstrate how specifically political arguments draw on and are enriched by philosophical accounts and/or how the specifically political arguments can clarify a more conceptual approach.

– Refer to Locke and/or Hegel to explain Martin Luther King’s argument for equal civil rights. Why is the philosophical understanding of rights important to their argument?
INCLUDE A GOOD Thesis—explain what you think you will be able to demonstrate, as well as why this thesis is important (i.e., why is it worthwhile to write on this topic?)
1. Argument—Briefly identify each step of your argument and explain what each step must accomplish. Additionally, provide a SUPPORTING QUOTATION, including SECTION NUMBER from the left of each paragraph, for each step of your argument.
2. Conclusion—Summarize how you will be able to support your thesis, and explain, in different words, the significance of your thesis.

The Phenomenology of Mind
— B —
Self Consciousness
A: Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness:
Lordship and Bondage
F
178
.
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it
exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it
is
only by being acknowledged or
“recognized”. The conception of this its unity in its duplication, of infinitude realizing itself
in self-consciousness, has many sides to it and encloses within it elements of varied
significance. Thus its moments must on the one hand be strictly kept apart in detailed
distinctiveness, and, on the other, in this distinction must, at the same time, also be taken as
not distinguished, or must always be accepted and understood in their opposite sense. This
double meaning of what is distinguished lies in the nature of self-consciousness: — of its
being infinite, or directly the opposite of the determinateness in which it is fixed. The
detailed exposition of the notion of this spiritual unity in its duplication will bring before us
the process of Recognition.
1. Duplicated Self-Consciousness
1. Duplicated Self-Consciousness
F
179
.
Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; it has come outside
itself. This has a double significance. First it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an
other
being; secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as
essentially real, but sees its own self in the other.
F
180
.
It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of that first double meaning,
and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it must set itself to sublate the other
independent being, in order thereby to become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it
thereupon proceeds to sublate its own self, for this other is itself.
F
181
.
This sublation in a double sense of its otherness in a double sense is at the same time
a return in a double sense into its self. For, firstly, through sublation, it gets back itself,
because it becomes one with itself again through the cancelling of
its
otherness; but
secondly, it likewise gives otherness back again to the other self-consciousness, for it was
aware of being in the other, it cancels this its own being in the other and thus lets the other
again go free.
F
182
.
This process of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness has in
this manner been represented as the action of one alone. But this action on the part of the
one has itself the double significance of being at once its own action and the action of that
other as well. For the other is likewise independent, shut up within itself, and there is
nothing in it which is not there through itself. The first does not have the object before it only
in the passive form characteristic primarily of the object of desire, but as an object existing
independently for itself, over which therefore it has no power to do anything for its own
behalf, if that object does not
per se
do what the first does to it. The process then is
absolutely the double process of both self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other do the same
as itself; each itself does what it demands on the part of the other, and for that reason does
what it does, only so far as the other does the same. Action from one side only would be
useless, because what is to happen can only be brought about by means of both.
F
183
.
The action has then a
double entente
not only in the sense that it is an act done to
itself as well as to the other, but also in the sense that the act
simpliciter
is the act of the one
as well as of the other regardless of their distinction.
F
184
.
In this movement we see the process repeated which came before us as the play of
forces; in the present case, however, it is found in consciousness. What in the former had
effect only for us [contemplating experience], holds here for the terms themselves. The
middle term is self-consciousness which breaks itself up into the extremes; and each extreme
is this interchange of its own determinateness, and complete transition into the opposite.
While
qua
consciousness, it no doubt comes outside itself, still, in being outside itself, it is at
the same time restrained within itself, it exists for itself, and its self-externalization is for
consciousness.
Consciousness
finds that it immediately is and is not another consciousness,
as also that this other is for itself only when it cancels itself as existing for itself , and has self-
existence only in the self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to the other,
through which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and each is to itself and to the
other an immediate self-existing reality, which, at the same time, exists thus for itself only
through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.
2. The Conflict of Self-Consciousness in Self-opposition
2. The Conflict of Self-Consciousness in Self-opposition
F
185
.
This pure conception of recognition, of duplication of self-consciousness within its
unity, we must now consider in the way its process appears for self-consciousness. It will, in
the first place, present the aspect of the disparity of the two, or the break-up of the middle
term into the extremes, which,
qua
extremes, are opposed to one another, and of which one
is merely recognized, while the other only recognizes.
F
186
.
Self-consciousness is primarily simple existence for self, self-identity by exclusion of
every other from itself. It takes its essential nature and absolute object to be Ego; and in this
immediacy, in this bare fact of its self-existence, it is individual. That which for it is other
stands as unessential object, as object with the impress and character of negation. But the
other is also a self-consciousness; an individual makes its appearance in antithesis to an
individual. Appearing thus in their immediacy, they are for each other in the manner of
ordinary objects. They are independent individual forms, modes of Consciousness that have
not risen above the bare level of life (for the existent object here has been determined as life).
They are, moreover, forms of consciousness which have not yet accomplished for one
another the process of absolute abstraction, of uprooting all immediate existence, and of
being merely the bare, negative fact of self-identical consciousness; or, in other words, have
not yet revealed themselves to each other as existing purely for themselves, i.e., as self-
consciousness. Each is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and hence its own
certainty of itself is still without truth. For its truth would be merely that its own individual
existence for itself would be shown to it to be an independent object, or, which is the same
thing, that the object would be exhibited as this pure certainty of itself. By the notion of
recognition, however, this is not possible, except in the form that as the other is for it, so it is
for the other; each in its self through its own action and again through the action of the other

nature of “rights”

YOU MUST READ THE READINGS
The readings are:
1- Locke, Of the State of Nature.
2- Hegel, Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness.
3- King, Letter from Birmingham Jail.
Reading are attached. And I will know if you have read them or not from the information because I have read them myself.
What is the nature of “rights”?
You should be able to demonstrate how specifically political arguments draw on and are enriched by philosophical accounts and/or how the specifically political arguments can clarify a more conceptual approach.

– Refer to Locke and/or Hegel to explain Martin Luther King’s argument for equal civil rights. Why is the philosophical understanding of rights important to their argument?
INCLUDE A GOOD Thesis—explain what you think you will be able to demonstrate, as well as why this thesis is important (i.e., why is it worthwhile to write on this topic?)
1. Argument—Briefly identify each step of your argument and explain what each step must accomplish. Additionally, provide a SUPPORTING QUOTATION, including SECTION NUMBER from the left of each paragraph, for each step of your argument.
2. Conclusion—Summarize how you will be able to support your thesis, and explain, in different words, the significance of your thesis.

The Phenomenology of Mind
— B —
Self Consciousness
A: Independence and Dependence of Self-Consciousness:
Lordship and Bondage
F
178
.
SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS exists in itself and for itself, in that, and by the fact that it
exists for another self-consciousness; that is to say, it
is
only by being acknowledged or
“recognized”. The conception of this its unity in its duplication, of infinitude realizing itself
in self-consciousness, has many sides to it and encloses within it elements of varied
significance. Thus its moments must on the one hand be strictly kept apart in detailed
distinctiveness, and, on the other, in this distinction must, at the same time, also be taken as
not distinguished, or must always be accepted and understood in their opposite sense. This
double meaning of what is distinguished lies in the nature of self-consciousness: — of its
being infinite, or directly the opposite of the determinateness in which it is fixed. The
detailed exposition of the notion of this spiritual unity in its duplication will bring before us
the process of Recognition.
1. Duplicated Self-Consciousness
1. Duplicated Self-Consciousness
F
179
.
Self-consciousness has before it another self-consciousness; it has come outside
itself. This has a double significance. First it has lost its own self, since it finds itself as an
other
being; secondly, it has thereby sublated that other, for it does not regard the other as
essentially real, but sees its own self in the other.
F
180
.
It must cancel this its other. To do so is the sublation of that first double meaning,
and is therefore a second double meaning. First, it must set itself to sublate the other
independent being, in order thereby to become certain of itself as true being, secondly, it
thereupon proceeds to sublate its own self, for this other is itself.
F
181
.
This sublation in a double sense of its otherness in a double sense is at the same time
a return in a double sense into its self. For, firstly, through sublation, it gets back itself,
because it becomes one with itself again through the cancelling of
its
otherness; but
secondly, it likewise gives otherness back again to the other self-consciousness, for it was
aware of being in the other, it cancels this its own being in the other and thus lets the other
again go free.
F
182
.
This process of self-consciousness in relation to another self-consciousness has in
this manner been represented as the action of one alone. But this action on the part of the
one has itself the double significance of being at once its own action and the action of that
other as well. For the other is likewise independent, shut up within itself, and there is
nothing in it which is not there through itself. The first does not have the object before it only
in the passive form characteristic primarily of the object of desire, but as an object existing
independently for itself, over which therefore it has no power to do anything for its own
behalf, if that object does not
per se
do what the first does to it. The process then is
absolutely the double process of both self-consciousnesses. Each sees the other do the same
as itself; each itself does what it demands on the part of the other, and for that reason does
what it does, only so far as the other does the same. Action from one side only would be
useless, because what is to happen can only be brought about by means of both.
F
183
.
The action has then a
double entente
not only in the sense that it is an act done to
itself as well as to the other, but also in the sense that the act
simpliciter
is the act of the one
as well as of the other regardless of their distinction.
F
184
.
In this movement we see the process repeated which came before us as the play of
forces; in the present case, however, it is found in consciousness. What in the former had
effect only for us [contemplating experience], holds here for the terms themselves. The
middle term is self-consciousness which breaks itself up into the extremes; and each extreme
is this interchange of its own determinateness, and complete transition into the opposite.
While
qua
consciousness, it no doubt comes outside itself, still, in being outside itself, it is at
the same time restrained within itself, it exists for itself, and its self-externalization is for
consciousness.
Consciousness
finds that it immediately is and is not another consciousness,
as also that this other is for itself only when it cancels itself as existing for itself , and has self-
existence only in the self-existence of the other. Each is the mediating term to the other,
through which each mediates and unites itself with itself; and each is to itself and to the
other an immediate self-existing reality, which, at the same time, exists thus for itself only
through this mediation. They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.
2. The Conflict of Self-Consciousness in Self-opposition
2. The Conflict of Self-Consciousness in Self-opposition
F
185
.
This pure conception of recognition, of duplication of self-consciousness within its
unity, we must now consider in the way its process appears for self-consciousness. It will, in
the first place, present the aspect of the disparity of the two, or the break-up of the middle
term into the extremes, which,
qua
extremes, are opposed to one another, and of which one
is merely recognized, while the other only recognizes.
F
186
.
Self-consciousness is primarily simple existence for self, self-identity by exclusion of
every other from itself. It takes its essential nature and absolute object to be Ego; and in this
immediacy, in this bare fact of its self-existence, it is individual. That which for it is other
stands as unessential object, as object with the impress and character of negation. But the
other is also a self-consciousness; an individual makes its appearance in antithesis to an
individual. Appearing thus in their immediacy, they are for each other in the manner of
ordinary objects. They are independent individual forms, modes of Consciousness that have
not risen above the bare level of life (for the existent object here has been determined as life).
They are, moreover, forms of consciousness which have not yet accomplished for one
another the process of absolute abstraction, of uprooting all immediate existence, and of
being merely the bare, negative fact of self-identical consciousness; or, in other words, have
not yet revealed themselves to each other as existing purely for themselves, i.e., as self-
consciousness. Each is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the other, and hence its own
certainty of itself is still without truth. For its truth would be merely that its own individual
existence for itself would be shown to it to be an independent object, or, which is the same
thing, that the object would be exhibited as this pure certainty of itself. By the notion of
recognition, however, this is not possible, except in the form that as the other is for it, so it is
for the other; each in its self through its own action and again through the action of the other