Topic: Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring

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Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and
the Arab Spring
Michael Makara
a
a
Department of Political Science , Syracuse University , Syracuse ,
NY
Published online: 17 Oct 2013.
To cite this article: Michael Makara (2013) Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring,
Democracy and Security, 9:4, 334-359, DOI: 10.1080/17419166.2013.802983
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2013.802983
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Democracy and Security, 9: 334–359, 2013
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1741-9166 print/1555-5860 online
DOI: 10.1080/17419166.2013.802983
Coup-Proofing, Militar y
Defection, and the Arab Spr ing
Michael M akara
Department of Political Science, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY
Despite implementing coup-proofing measures designed to maintain military loyalty,
Arab regimes proved vulnerable to military defection during the Arab Spring. Some
Arab militaries defected amid widespread protests, and some remained loyal, while
others split between these two options. This article explores civil–military relations in
Egypt, Syria, and Yemen and develops a theory of military defection based on three
coup-proofing strategies: building parallel security institutions, distributing material
incentives, and exploiting communal ties. Building parallel security institutions and
material incentives create competition within the security apparatus that motivates
military defection. However, exploiting communal ties mitigates these effects and more
successfully maintains military loyalty.
Keywords: Arab Spring, Civil–Military Relations, Coup-Proofing, Military Defection
INTR ODUCTION
A notable empirical puzzle has emerged from the Arab Spring: when confronted
with mass uprisings and orders to repress protesters, some Arab militaries
(Tunisia and Egypt) defected to the opposition, and some remained loyal to
the ruling regime (Syria and Bahrain), while others split between these two
options (Yemen and Libya).
1
This variation is particularly puzzling given that,
for decades, Middle Eastern regimes had effectively exercised civilian con-trol over their armed forces. By implementing a variety of “coup-proofing”
strategies, these governments had long guaranteed that their militaries would
remain subservient and not turn against the civilian leadership. Beyond
merely explaining the absence of military coups, existing coup-proofing the-ories provide little reason why these strategies should not have prevented
defection among Arab militaries as they confronted mass protests throughout
The author would like to thank Miriam Elman, Brian Taylor, Eric Rittinger, Seth Jolly,
Evan Laksmana, and Trish Siplon for their comments on earlier drafts of this article.
Address correspondence to Michael Makara, Syracuse University, Department of
Political Science, 100 Eggers Hall, Syracuse, NY 13244-1020. E-mail: mamakara@
maxwell.syr.edu
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Coup-Proofing and the Arab Spring335
2011. However, the variation in military behavior during this period suggests
that not all coup-proofing strategies are created equally. Explaining this empir-ical puzzle thus advances our understanding of coup-proofing strategies by
elucidating which measures solidify military support for a ruling regime during
periods of widespread popular dissent and which ones actually make a regime
vulnerable to military defections.
To explain the variation in security apparatus behavior during the Arab
Spring, I develop a theory of military defection behavior amid popular uprisings
based on three coup-proofing strategies: building parallel security institutions,
distributing material incentives, and exploiting communal ties. Strategies
based solely on creating parallel security institutions and distributing material
incentives can create divisions and competition within the security apparatus
that make the military susceptible to defection when the ruling regime faces
mass protests. However, coup-proofing strategies that exploit communal ties
mitigate these effects and are more likely to maintain military loyalty. The
lack of a communal strategy in Egypt left the regime exposed to the internal
divisions that make defection likely. Syria’s ruling regime, by contrast, has suc-cessfully maintained security apparatus loyalty by exploiting communal ties,
while the split in Yemen’s armed forces resulted from a strategy that did so
only partially.
This article begins by outlining the various coup-proofing strategies that
Arab regimes have adopted to keep their militaries in check and explains why
military behavior during the Arab Spring is so puzzling, both empirically and
theoretically. Next, I develop a typological theory of the relationship between
military defection and different coup-proofing measures based on military
behavior during the recent Arab uprisings. Finally, I illustrate the plausibil-ity of this theory by presenting evidence from Egypt, Syria, and Yemen during
the Arab Spring.
COUP-PR OOFING AND THE ARAB SPRING P UZZLE
Scholars have demonstrated that building a strong, capable security appara-tus is key for repressing internal dissent, preventing regime overthrow, and
sustaining authoritarian rule.
2
By empowering their armed forces, however,
authoritarian regimes run the risk that their militaries will challenge for polit-ical preeminence.
3
To protect themselves from military coups, authoritarian
regimes throughout the world bolstered their rule by implementing a variety
of “coup-proofing” strategies.
4
Such measures subordinate the armed forces to a
country’s political leadership, structuring civil–military relations in a way that
reduces both their ability and willingness to challenge the political status quo.
In the Middle East, coup-proofing strategies have virtually eliminated coup
attempts since 1980, a remarkable feat given the region’s tumultuous history
of civil–military relations.
5
In fact, the relationship between Middle Eastern
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336 M. Makara
regimes and their militaries has been so strong over the past few decades that,
before the Arab Spring, political scientists had overwhelmingly commented on
these regimes’ exceptional strength and durability.
6
Three coup-proofing measures in particular have been common throughout
the world: building parallel security institutions, distributing material incen-tives, and exploiting communal ties. First, regimes create parallel militaries
and multiple layers of security services to insulate themselves from mili-tary interventions. Parallel militaries are autonomous from the regular armed
forces and are tasked primarily with defending the ruling regime. Possessing
a capacity that mirrors conventional military roles, parallel militaries prevent
coups by balancing against the regular army.
7
Parallel militaries do not nec-essarily need to be able to defeat the regular armed forces, but their ability
to resist would-be military dissidents in defense of the ruling regime discour-ages coup attempts by raising the costs of military intervention. Additionally,
security services, police, and intelligence organizations enjoy surveillance and
intelligence capacities that allow them to monitor the regular army and
uncover coup plots before they occur. Such forces almost always enjoy a chain
of command distinct from that of the regular military and an organizational
structure that ties them directly to the political leadership.
8
Often endowed
with overlapping jurisdictions and with the civilian leadership in control of
how resources and responsibilities are distributed, these organizations compete
with one another for privilege rather than against the regime itself.
9
While cre-ating parallel militaries and establishing multiple layers of security services
defend regimes through different mechanisms, they each represent a more
general attempt to undermine security apparatus cohesion and pit different
factions against each other.
Second, ruling regimes maintain security apparatus loyalty by keeping
their various sectors well funded and distributing material benefits to armed
forces personnel. Large defense budgets prevent coups both by keeping the
army happy and by empowering parallel security institutions to perform their
coup-proofing functions.
10
It comes as little surprise, therefore, that authori-tarian regimes often prioritize the development of security apparatus capacity
over other domestic concerns, increasing funding for the armed forces even
when economic hardship forces budget cuts in other areas.
11
In addition to
maintaining a large defense budget, those in power will often purchase the
military’s loyalty with economic incentives and patronage unavailable to the
rest of the population.
12
Security apparatus personnel often have privileged
access to a country’s best housing, medical care, and economic opportunities.
In theory, such a strategy co-opts the military and ties its fate to that of the
regime. By granting economic benefits, the ruling regime attempts to give
the military a stake in its continued survival, thereby discouraging any aspi-rations the military might have to intervene in politics against its civilian
leadership.
13
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Coup-Proofing and the Arab Spring337
Finally, authoritarian regimes often exploit communal identities when
building their armed forces and promoting officers, granting particular favor to
“communities of trust” with close ties to the regime.
14
The relevant community
of trust can vary based on context, with family, tribe, and sect often serving this
function in the Middle East.
15
The common denominator between each of these
communities, however, is their shared identity with a ruling regime, which dif-ferentiates them from the rest of society. The notion of a besieged minority
group—and they are almost always minorities—in need of regime protection is
the key mechanism through which the communal strategy operates. Regardless
of the specific community in question, this shared identity is used as an indica-tor of loyalty to the regime. By advantaging communities of trust, therefore, a
regime seeks to secure its armed forces’ unwavering support by wedding their
interests to those of the regime.
16
Over time, the identification gap between
the privileged community of trust and the rest of society becomes reified as the
disadvantaged majority grows to resent what it perceives to be institutional
discrimination on the basis of communal ties.
In addition to preventing coups, the strategies discussed above should also
protect authoritarian regimes from military defection during popular upris-ings such as those witnessed during the Arab Spring. As Taylor notes, “ …
the notion of a coup is really shorthand for a range of military behaviors,
both active and passive, that can lead to a change in the executive leader-ship of the state.”
17
Indeed, although scholars usually discuss coup-proofing
with reference to coups in the classic sense, in practice it is unlikely that any
authoritarian ruler that coup-proofs his regime does not also intend to insulate
himself from the myriad ways in which the armed forces can challenge a civil-ian leadership.
18
More than merely preventing coups, therefore, coup-proofing
strategies are intended to bind the security apparatus to the ruling regime to
such an extent that the two become mutually dependent on one another.
19
Given the above discussion, military behavior during the Arab Spring
presents a puzzling variation: the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries defected in
their entirety when faced with mass protests; those in Syria and Bahrain con-tinue to protect the ruling regime; and the armed forces in Yemen and Libya
split between protection and defection. Empirically, this variation is puzzling
given that each regime had implemented a variety of coup-proofing measures
designed to maintain military loyalty; theoretically, the military defection that
occurred in four countries during the Arab Spring defies what scholars have
come to expect from coup-proof regimes. Military behavior during the Arab
Spring thus suggests that not all coup-proofing strategies are equally effective
at maintaining civilian control over a regime’s security apparatus. Rather, it is
clear that coup-proofing strategies that successfully maintain military loyalty
during periods of stability do not necessarily do so when regimes face popular
threats to their rule.
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338 M. Makara
This puzzle highlights a theoretical blind spot in existing civil–military
relations research: while scholars have demonstrated that coup-proofing is an
effective way to maintain military loyalty, they have said much less about how
these strategies might actually make authoritarian regimes vulnerable when
they face popular threats to their rule. The literature on this topic, moreover,
has focused on how coup-proofing affects military effectiveness in interstate
war,
20
giving little attention to how such strategies might impact a regime’s
ability to use its security apparatus to quell domestic challenges. The Arab
Spring can help fill this gap by providing scholars with an opportunity to
explore how different coup-proofing strategies affect military behavior when
called upon to repress popular dissent.
Addressing this puzzle also speaks to more general debates on the durabil-ity of authoritarianism. Scholars agree that a robust security apparatus that
can repress popular dissent is key for maintaining authoritarian rule and that
ruling regimes become vulnerable when their armed forces are either unable
or unwilling to offer their protection.
21
However, as David Art notes, research
on authoritarian durability has yet to move much beyond this insight and has
said little about how ruling regimes build strong, loyal coercive institutions
or when such efforts are likely to fail.
22
This research generally understands
security apparatus “robustness” as a function of its size or budget; however, the
Arab Spring demonstrates that our ability to gauge the strength of a security
apparatus—and thus the durability of authoritarian regimes—requires greater
attention to the effectiveness of the variety of strategies that regimes use to
guarantee security apparatus loyalty. Examining how different coup-proofing
strategies affect military behavior during periods of widespread popular dis-sent can thus improve our understanding of when authoritarian leaders can
count on continued security apparatus support and when these rulers are
vulnerable to regime change.
RESEARCH DESIGN
This article develops a theory about the relationship between coup-proofing
strategies and military defection behavior amid popular uprisings against
authoritarian rule. It establishes the plausibility of the theory by providing
case evidence from the Arab Spring through a combination of typological theo-rizing and process-tracing that sheds light on understanding military defection
during the recent uprisings. The theory is based on evidence gathered through
a “diverse” case selection strategy, in which the cases under study achieve max-imum variance on the dependent variable (defection, continued loyalty, security
apparatus split).
23
This strategy is ideal for theory development, as it selects
cases in a way that highlights the empirical puzzle in need of explanation.
By using these cases to establish the theory’s plausibility, the article lays the
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Coup-Proofing and the Arab Spring339
groundwork for future research that can test and potentially amend the theory
based on additional case evidence.
The explanatory typology presented within articulates how different coup-proofing strategies (the independent variable) should affect the military’s
decision to protect the ruling regime amid mass protests or defect to the
opposition (the dependent variable). The analysis then illustrates these dynam-ics empirically using process tracing to explore one case from each type.
Rather than relying on correlation and statistical probability, process-tracing
unpacks the causal chain through which a hypothesized independent vari-able affects a given outcome.
24
It does so by providing evidence of the causal
mechanisms articulated by a given theory. Researchers establish confidence
in conclusions based on process-tracing when the data gathered for a case
study create a complete, unbroken narrative of the steps linking the inde-pendent and dependent variables. These two methods are appropriate for
achieving this article’s theory development goals. In this respect, typologi-cal theorizing defines the expected interaction between different coup-proofing
strategies, popular uprisings, and military defection behavior, while process-tracing confirms the theory’s plausibility by bridging the gap between theory
and empirics.
COUP-PR OOFING AND MILITA RY DEFECTION: A TYPOLOGY
This section presents a theory of military defection behavior based on three
coup-proofing strategies: building parallel security institutions, distributing
material incentives, and exploiting communal ties.
25
It is limited in scope to
cases in which authoritarian rulers order their security apparatuses to repress
popular challenges to their rule. I define defection as the armed forces’ unwill-ingness to fulfill these orders.
26
This minimal definition includes instances in
which the armed forces simply refuse to fire on demonstrators, as well as cases
in which they take power for themselves or fight alongside an armed opposition
to the regime. The refusal to defend the regime is the theoretically relevant link
between each of these examples. It indicates that a regime no longer enjoys
the armed forces’ loyalty and, consequently, that the coup-proofing strategies
designed to maintain this loyalty have failed.
The theory assumes that all militaries and security personnel seek to
protect their corporate interests and will be motivated to defect from the rul-ing regime when these interests are violated. Eric Nordlinger identifies four
interests that can motivate such behavior: budgetary support, autonomy, the
absence of functional rivals, and institutional survival.
27
Of these, institutional
survival is the most fundamental, representing an “existential interest” that
must be guaranteed before a military can pursue its other corporate interests.
28
Although it is difficult to discern the relative importance of these interests,
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340 M. Makara
this theory asserts only that institutional survival will be the armed forces’ top
priority.
Given these assumptions, the combination of two coup-proofing
strategies—building parallel security institutions and distributing material
incentives—risks creating rivalry within the security apparatus that has
historically motivated military defection from authoritarian regimes.
29
These
“divide and rule” strategies create multiple, autonomous institutions that
compete over finite budget resources and contend with one another over access
to regime patronage. They thus weaken the armed forces’ overall cohesion and,
as in any competition, create what Terence Lee terms “winners” and “losers”
within the security apparatus.
30
Those who benefit least from the status quo
will be the least wedded to the ruling regime. If given the opportunity, these
“losers” will thus be the most willing to break with the regime in an attempt
to achieve a more favorable position vis-à-vis their rivals within the security
apparatus.
However, whereas divide-and-rule coup-proofing strategies and intra-security apparatus competition are common across countries, defections and
other political interventions by the armed forces are not.
31
Regardless of the
grievances that “losers” within the security apparatus might hold, turning
against the ruling regime is a risky venture. Personnel that conspire against
the regime likely face harsh retribution should their plot fail, which is likely
given that rival parallel military and intelligence organizations are built to
snuff out and prevent this kind of behavior. Despite structuring the security
apparatus in a way that might motivate some factions to defect, therefore,
overt dissent is unlikely to occur without a significant reduction in the risk
involved.
32
Despite being an effective way for an authoritarian regime to maintain
control of the security apparatus, divide-and-rule strategies becomes far less
effective when a regime faces popular uprisings against its rule. Such events
signal that the regime’s grip on society is breaking and that its legitimacy
has been undermined. Popular uprisings similarly indicate that constituencies
exist within society that can provide protection for those in the armed forces
who break ranks, thus lowering the costs of defection. Behavior that was risky
under normal conditions thus becomes possible during periods of widespread
unrest. Grasping this opportunity, those within the armed forces that have
been neglected by the status quo will defect in the hopes that regime change
and a new government will better provide for the interests that Nordlinger
identifies. As Lee notes, initial defections may then create a cascade of defection
within the armed forces, as even those factions most loyal to the regime come
to believe that they must defect to preserve their privileged status and avoid
being on the losing side of the uprising when the dust settles.
33
However, even when combined with popular mobilization against a regime,
competition within the security apparatus does not make defection inevitable.
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Coup-Proofing and the Arab Spring341
Rather, the effect of intra-security apparatus competition on defection behavior
depends on how the armed forces have been structured relative to a country’s
salient communal cleavages. Communal coup-proofing tactics raise the costs of
defection by pitting the regime’s community of trust against those communal
groups that have been marginalized. Resentment against the privileged com-munal group is often pervasive among those communities that find themselves
politically and economically disadvantaged.
34
These feelings of injustice are
exacerbated when the communally recruited armed forces have historically
committed crimes and repression against society.
35
Collectively, these factors
create and sustain negative stereotypes about security apparatus personnel,
reinforcing the identification gap between the armed forces and society.
Far from providing allies for potential defectors, therefore, popular upris-ings and the prospect of regime change threaten communally recruited security
apparatus personnel. A new regime would likely perceive such forces to be
disloyal and hostile, perceptions that often result in purges, “ethnic reshuf-fling,” and “wholesale ethnic turnover” in the security apparatus.
36
Therefore,
rather than being institutionalized as part of the state, the security appara-tus’s existence is based on communal ties with the existing regime. Threats
to the ruling regime thus represent a threat to the security apparatus itself,
turning the regime’s community of trust into a besieged minority whose very
institutional survival depends on thwarting challenges to the regime’s rule.
Communal strategies thus encourage security apparatus personnel recruited
on this basis to repress popular uprisings against a regime, as their most basic
corporate interest—institutional survival—depends on the regime’s continued
dominance.
This theory organizes communal coup-proofing strategies into three gen-eral types: a-communal, communal, and partial-communal. What distinguishes
these strategies is the extent to which they exploit communal ties that exist
within society. While intra-security apparatus competition motivates defection
in all three, defection is plausible only when not obstructed by a communal
strategy that ties security apparatus personnel to the regime.
A-Communal
A-communal coup-proofing strategies are those in which no communal
group is privileged when staffing the security apparatus. Instead, the armed
forces’ demographic composition resembles that of society more generally. This
coup-proofing strategy type is the least likely to prevent defection amid popu-lar uprisings, as the competition created by the proliferation of parallel security
institutions and control over material incentives can operate unabated. Unlike
coup-proofing strategies with a communal component, a-communal security
apparatuses are not wedded to the status quo by fear of reprisal from commu-nal rivals. The absence of a communal dimension insulates the armed forces
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342 M. Makara
from changes in the civilian leadership and reduces the risk that security
apparatus personnel will be purged as a result of regime change. Under these
circumstances, the armed forces’ institutional survival is ensured despite the
presence of popular dissent against the political regime. Defection from the
ruling regime thus becomes a plausible option for pursuing other corporate
interests, as there is no reason to believe that the armed forces would not
survive a political transition.
Communal
A communal strategy is the most effective way to prevent military
defections. In pursuing this strategy, ruling regimes recruit most, if not all,
security apparatus personnel from loyal communities of trust in an effort
to achieve homogenization between political and military elites.
37
Security
apparatuses that fall into this category are characterized by the fact that
communities of trust staff the overwhelming majority of the officer corps and
other key positions, as well as a disproportionate percentage of career officers
and the rank and file. Personnel recruited on this basis will be threatened by
widespread dissent against the regime and the potential for political change
that this creates, as there is little chance that communally recruited mili-tary personnel will survive a power transfer. The communal strategy thus
creates a sense of being a besieged minority among security apparatus per-sonnel, binding them to the ruling regime for protection. Although competition
within the security apparatus might exist, it should take a backseat to concerns
over institutional survival. For this reason, coup-proofing based on a commu-nal strategy makes defection unlikely and, ceteris paribus , should result in
one-sided repression of popular uprisings against authoritarian rule.
Par tial-Communal
Finally, a partial-communal coup-proofing strategy is one in which only a
portion of the security apparatus is recruited based on communal ties. Unlike
the communal strategy, many within the officer corps—as well as within the
rank and file—share no communal ties with the regime. This leaves a sig-nificant portion of the armed forces without any special ties to the political
leadership and, consequently, without any particular stake in the regime’s
survival. Partial-communal strategies thus create competing attitudes toward
regime change, with those personnel recruited on a communal basis remain-ing invested in the regime’s continued rule and those without communal ties
to the regime being more likely to pursue changes to the status quo. For this
latter group, defection is therefore a plausible solution with which to rectify
marginalization or threats to institutional interests. Given their involvement
in the armed forces, moreover, defecting military personnel have the arms
and training with which to challenge those in power. All else being equal,
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Coup-Proofing and the Arab Spring343
Intra-Security Apparatus
Competition
(Building Parallel Military
Institutions and Distributing Material
Benefits)
A-Communal Strategy Partial-Communal Strategy Communal Strategy
Popular Uprising against Ruling Regime
Security Apparatus Defects
Security Apparatus
Fractures
Security Apparatus Remains
Loyal
Figure 1: Militar y defection as a function of c oup-proofing.
partial-communal strategies are thus likely to result in armed conflict and
civil war, with well-armed defectors confronting hardliners in the security
apparatus whose institutional survival is tied to the regime. Fig. 1 illustrates
the explanatory typology presented in this section.
It is important to note that the three general coup-proofing strategies
described above are best understood as ideal types. This is particularly rel-evant for the communal strategy, which, as Quinlivan points out, is difficult
to implement to perfection given that communities of trust are often small.