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Global Strategy and Enterprise.

Topic: Global Strategy and Enterprise

Description: [?]
Preferred language style: English (U.K.)

BUSM 3101 ? Global Strategy and Enterprise
Semester 1 – 2010/11
End of Module Assessment – Open Book Exam

Instructions to Candidates

? Time allowed 2 hours
? Answer three questions
? Each question carries an equal weight
? This is an open book exam. You may refer to notes and books but in all other respects usual examination conditions apply
? Start each answer on a new page
? You may answer the questions in any order
? All answers must be written legibly and in ink

Exam Questions ?M&S case study

With reference to the M&S case study you are required to answer three questions below. Wherever possible you should make use of relevant models, theories and concepts to support your answers.

Question 1

what are the key elements causing M&S’s strategy drift in clothing industry and what is the significance of the drift

Question 2
how M&S adapt to new environment(ansoff matrix)

Question 3

how do M&S achieve success by using different kinds of strategies
Assessment Criteria
In order to obtain a good grade you will need to:
? Provide evidence that you have read relevant material that can be applied to the topic
? Demonstrate the ability to critically apply relevant and different models of strategic management to each question
? Identify both internal and external forces that have acted upon the company’s strategic decision making
? Demonstrate a clear understanding of the relationship between corporate strategy and organisational structure as it applies in the case of M&S
? Present your work in a coherent and logical manner
Case study
Marks & Spencer?s turnaround

This case was written by Jaya Israni, under the direction of CSV Ratna, ICFAI Press. It is intended to be used as the basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate aither effective or ineffective of a management situation.
The case was compiled from published sources.

Marks & Spencer?s turnaround
?Retailers must constantly rediscover their talent for innovation, quality, and service?and, above all, ensure that all-important trust between retailers an customers ,?
Luc Vandevelde
Chaiman, M&S

For years, M&S ruled the retail roost, and reveled in profits quarter-after-quarter, until some bad decisions, complacency and boardroom battles took the company away form its glorious days. In January 2000, after continuous decline in earnings, Luc Vandevelde was was taken in to revive M&S? flagging fortunes. And what the Belgian did to the birt supermarket chain is no magic. Rather he followed the tried and testes approach to turnaround, but with a sense of urgency and heightened sensitivity toward competition, which was something new M&S.

In may 2000, he actually staked his reputation on successfully enlivening Luc Vandevelde, promising to resign if he does not restore financial health to the company within two years. Well Luc Vandevelde, the daring Belgian boss of the company, gets to keep his job as after some years of elusion, the profit are back of Britain?s cherished yet troubled retailer. M&S, for the first time since 1999, clocked an increase in profits for the year 2002. Once Luc Vandevelde was convinced that the company was well on its way to recovery, he reverted to his original position as chairman and Roger Holmes was appointed as the chief executive. From January1, 2003, Vandevelde?s role as chairman is part-time. And the turnaround is cemented by the heartening results for the year ended 31 March 2003 when pre-tax profits rose by11.5% to ?921.3 million(exhibit1).

Company?s history

Michael marks; a Russian born Polish refugee opened a stall at Leeds Kirkgate Market and soon was running a chain of open-air stores under the logo: ?don?t ask the price?it?s a penny?. Marks & Spencer (M&S) came into being in 1894 when Marks formed a partnership with Thomas Spencer, a former cashier with the wholesale company IJ Dewhurst. The company headquarters were shifted to Manchester. Shops moved indoor and improved in quality.

In 1914, M&S bought the London Penny Bazaar Company. In 1926, it became a public company. It was in this year that M&S also began selling textiles. Then, in the year 1982, the St Michael Trade Mark was registered. By 1931, M&S had branched out into foods and acquired a major presence in London. After the World War ?, it opened stores outside Britain also and their first European store was opened in Paris, in 1957. M&S went into finance with their first charge card in 1985. In the year 1998, it acquired Brooks?s brothers, an American clothing company and King?s Super market, a U.S food chain. In the same year, it also opened its first store in Hong Kong.

Hint of trouble
M&S continued its upward journey all through the 1990s. During the late 1990s, M&S controlled 35% of the UK lingerie market, 25% of the men?s suits and 50% of the chilled ready meals. For more than a century, M&S was the epitome of enlightened capitalism, providing shoppers with quality and value clothing unrivalled by competitors. The company had come to be trusted by the Britain. M&S had been successful for too long. Therefore, when competition started building up, it did not pay much attention. It didn?t feel any pressure to improve business had become too confident of its capabilities. Over the years, its products became outdated and they were perceived as stodgy.

By November 1998, profits began to fall and an attempted boardroom coup rocked the company to its core. At a time when consumer demand in Britain and uncertain and Asia was under slump, the then Chairman and Chief Executive, sir Richard Greenbury announced a ?3.7 billion global expansion plan, updating technology and expending floor space worldwide. Expansion meant that it needed more stuff to fill up its stores with. M&S did not have enough to fill up its stores and whatever it did have was outdated and novel that most fashion conscious customers did not want to purchase. Even when Brooks Brothers, acquired in America, was losing money rapidly, the chain expended extensively and irrationally, opening 40 stores in France, Germany, Spain, and Belgium. At home also, in an expansive spree, M&S increased the size of its average British store by more than a third.

The way of doing things at M&S was also outdated. M&S always used British suppliers, neglecting the cost savings that could get if they bought from overseas. Its competitors imported cheap clothes, thereby selling them at lower prices. Whereas, M&S ended up selling outmoded clothes at higher prices, future eroding its clothes sales. Clothes at its oversea stores were also too expensive as the final stitching was done in Britain. M&S had specialist buyers operating from the central buying office from where it was distributed to stores, an age-old formula. The store?s manager followed central direction on merchandising, layout, store design, training and so on. All their stores were identical, leading to a consistency of image but it also meant conformity, with very little local discretion. The store?s manager had restrictions on how to respond to the local needs of customers. The worst was that M&S was not interested in catering to current fashion and trends. M&S had an early lead in selling up-market ready-made meals. But even as Britain?s big supermarkets, Tesco and Sainsbury, were catching up, there was a ?snobbish? disinclination to change at the company.

Boardroom battle
Along with competition and complacency, its corporate governance and inward-looking culture also played a significant role in M&S? decline. The company had few outsiders in the board to provide new perspectives. The board consisted of 16 executive directors, most of whom had spent a major part of their careers at M&S. out of the six non-executives; one was from the founding family. Such a parochial governing body would have worked in the 60s, but in the cutthroat competitive years of the 90s, it was outmoded. Moreover, with M&S into financial services, the board?s retail-only experience was of no help. Also, their local knowledge wasn?t of much help as it was expanding overseas, in this context, the narrowness of experience of M&S?s senior managers and board directors became a weakness.

There were doubts about M&S? corporate strategy in the second half of 1998. as a result of this, boardroom differences emerged. Investors who were desperate to see the retail chain back on its winning track, attributed most of the company?s governance ills to the fact that the center of power rested with Sir Richard. They wanted jobs of chainman and chief executive split.

Greenbury had cast a shadow over attempts to restructure M&S since he was pushed side-ways after a bitter boardroom row in November 1998. As non-executive chairman, he still worked three days a week at M&S?s head office in London?s Baker Street. Greenbury was known to oppose some of the changes proposed in a 700-page strategy document discussed by M&S directors. That year, he was one of the directors up for re-election by shareholders at the AGM to be held on July 15. But according to insiders, early voting returns showed that Greenbury risked humiliation if he turned up at the meeting. Shareholders who once sheered Greenbury as the steadily increased M&S? market share and successfully steered the firm through the recession of the early Nineties, started blaming him for letting profits halve in 1998 from ?1.1 billion to ?655 million and for standing in the way of attempts by Salsbury to revive the High Street chain. After months of boardroom battles, Sir Richard finally resigned in 1999. Even as Salsbury took the baton from Sir Richard, profits feel for the year 1990-99, due to expansion and a fall in overseas profits, caused partly by the strong pound. Though effectively the chief executive?s and the chairman?s roles were split and two different people were responsible for running or rather keep it afloat, were engaged in a bitter power struggle, giving their competitors the free hand to eat into its market share.
Salsbury started reorganizing the company by including a new global supply chain, getting clothes made wherever the costs were the lowest in the world. He also made attempts to revive the brand by hiring well-known designers. Salabury was highly ambitious and wanted to make M&S a gobal retailer. And observers believed that his obsession with his ambitious ruined the company. They believe that he was so sure that his attempts would yield good results that he overreacted when the profits fell. Salsbury hired 12 teams of management consultants, including one whose job was to advise on the use of management consultants. The speed and force of reorganization efforts, suggested by the consultants, demoralized the staff, hastening the company?s fall. Salsbury, guided by the consultants? wisdom, gave shop staff greater control over purchasing and a new looking for the stores. He also de-emphasized the famous St Michael brand, and introduced new designer clothes. All of this, to guide M&S away from the ?push? strategy to a customer ?pull? one, under the illusion that they knew what the customers needed. But all his attempts were futile as sales continued to fall. M&S? slumping sales had made it a takeover target. And rumors started flying that it was, in fact, a target for many takeover bids.
Revival
In January 2000, as an attempt to bolster the company?s defenses against any takeover bids, Belgain-born Mr. Vandevelde, who was with the French retailer Promodes then, was taken in as chairman. His immediate job was to fix the boardroom problems. He blamed the company?s decline on his predecessor Sir Richard Greenbury . He said the blamelaid with the people who were running the company when it was who is doing well and who did not anticipate the changes in the market place and customer behavior when they had the money, the resources and the talent to do something about it. Vandevelde overhauled the management and hired fresh talent from outside the industry.

In a bid to throw off its frumpy image, M&S unveiled a range of designer wear by catwalk stars Katharine Kamnett, Betty Jackson and Julien Macdonald?The Autograph Collection-in February 2000. The chain reported a slump in full-year pre-tax profits and cut its dividend for the first time in its history, in July. Profits for the year upto April 1 dropped to ?417.5m, against ?546.1m the year before, while the dividend was slashed from 14.4p to 9p. Like-for-like sales in the UK tumbled to 7.2% Mr. Vandevelde said the chain was pumping money into restructuring its supply chain and modernizing its brand. A new concept store programme was unveiled. It also introduced a new staff uniform after deeming the old navy and green skirts too frumpy.

In September, the firm paid ?1.2m to three directors who were leaving. Among them was Peter Salsbury, who stepped down as chief executive, taking a year?s salary of ?560,000. Mr. Vandevelde announced that he had snatched Roger Holmes, chief executive of Kingfisher?s electrical division, as Mr. Salsbury?s replacement.

In November 2000, Mr. Vandevelde said that there was no quick fix, as the retailer reported a drop in first-half profits, and unveiled plans to axe six stores . He tried hard to focus on core British market by selling off such ailing U.S business as the Brooks Brothers clothing chain King?s supermarkets. He pulled out of France aimed labor unrest and closed the retailer?s 38 stores in Europe, eliminating 4,000 jobs. There was a lot of opposition from overseas employees and various trade unions, when Mr. Vandevelde decided to pull out France. Following a initially emotional and angry reaction, workers responded by demonstrating outside Marks & Spencer stores. The trade union criticized the announced closure of the stores-blaming the group?s chief executive-and called on workers to rally to save their jobs. Some union took their case before the Paris district court to seek a ruling suspending the redundancy procedure on the ground that the works council had not been informed in advance. The court ruled in favor of the unions on 9 April, and suspended the closure of the France shops until the company had fulfilled all its information and consultation obligations. The stores were closed finally. Pre-tax profits for the interim fell to ?183.4m from ?192.8m, with group like-for-like sales down by 1.2%.

Another major change was that it started refocusing on its two pillars of strength-lingerie and food. Lingerie had been M&S?s best-selling product in Britain that commanded more than 30% of the market, and M&S was considering its export in future through small boutiques. Food was another growth area: Sales of M&S?s high-quality, read-to-eat meals accounted for more than 40% of sales, despite competition from supermarket chains Tesco and J Sainsbury.

Getting the clothes collection business on track was a major challenge and more importantly, the key to the turnaround had been getting the clothes collection right. In a bid to gain the lost ground to style-conscious rivals such as Sweden?s H&M Hennes & Mauritz, Spain?s Zara, and midmarket British retailers Debenhams and Next, Vandevelde also brought in creative talent to pep up M&S? drab clothing ranges. In a much-needed move, he severed longstanding ties with British suppliers and shifted three-fourth of all apparel production overseas, giving a big boost to clothing margins. A large proportion of its manufacturing supply base was shifted to Hong Kong, the Chinese mainland and other overseas centers.

Vandevelde modemized his store in Britain. Almost 80% stores in UK were redone and given more modern look.?with write walls, intensified lighting, light display and a more varied and attractive merchandising. He hired George Davies, the man behind the successful George line of clothing at Wal-Mart Store Inc.?s British subsidiary, ASDA Group Ltd, to design a new range of clothing. Davies proved to be the golden goose; his Per Una collection, trendy line of women?s wear, was a hit and was a largely responsible to its increased clothes sales. In fact, sales of Per Una dad been so strong since September 2001 launch that the retailer had to delay rolling out of the brand in all its stores. Revamping the popular womenswear had also borne fruit. Four out of the five best sellers across Scottish stores were from the ladies department. A major reason for the newfound popularity of the womenswear department has been the discovery of what M&S called ?segmentation?. Basically, the sections allowed customers to find exactly what they need in the shortest of time. In effect, while the Per Una and Perfect (another collection by Davies?) ranges gained loyal fans, the old favorites also contributed to the success.

The company had also leaned the importance of fashion press and communication. It was making every effort to get column space in fashion press and used the power of celebrity to cell products. Involving the footballer David Beckam in the design team responsible for a range of clothes for boys aged 11-15 was an astute business move. The use of the iconic celebrities was not new to M&S though; it had successfully used them in the past. Its ?Magic and Sparkle? Christmas campaign, which featured a host of celebrities talking about their seasonal favorites from the stores, has been very popular even to this day. In the overall plan to reinforce its image, the company aimed to create M&S branded ?communities? centered around the group?s products on the internet. Offline, it intended to extend the M&S brand future into financial services, by offering travel insurance and the like.

In the food business, it refocused on its ready-to-eat meals, where it had lost precious ground to competitors. Supply and packaging were revamped while new avenues ad franchises options were explored. Vandevelde also fixed up the company?s culture. He instilled an entrepreneurial spirit. Buying decisions were now made at individual stores and based on local tastes instead of being imposed by an impassive head office. Vandevelde even ushered in a younger management team, replacing all of its senior manager as well as board members. The board was restructured by removing some of older non-executives, many of them insiders at the firm.

Vandevelde?s restructuring efforts paid-off. M&S? same-store sales were up more than 4% for the year ending March 2002. The new collections helped curtail a decline in clothing sales. These rose by 0.8% in the quarter ending Sept. 30, an improvement over the previous year, when they were down 9.1%. Profits were up by 30 per cent and, more importantly, M&S?s share price doubled. M&S clocked a massive 50.9 per cent increase in operating profits, which before exceptional comes to ?505 millions. Thanks largely to Per Una, along with the new Blue Harbour menswear range. Clothing sales, which are the key to the group?s recovery, rose by 14.8 percent. Group sales improved 7.7 percent on a like-for-like basis, while food sales improved 1.5 percent, broadly in line with analyst expectations.

Current scenario
The turnover from M&S? three core segments, UK Retail, international Retail and Financial Services had increased in the FY03 from FY02. At the same time, the capital expenditure has also gone up. M&S won the award of High Street Fashion Retailer Of The Year at the 9th Prima High Street Fashion Award.

Recent evidence from sector rivals and retail organizations pointed to increasingly subdued conditions on the high street. Analysis reckoned that M&S would report like-to-like sales growth of 3.0-5.0 percent for general merchandise, which includes clothing, footwear, and home wear. That represented a slowdown from an 8.8 percent growth of between 3.0 and 5.0 percent. The fourth-quarter food sales are seen up around 2.0-4.0 percent. M&S continued to win market share. Clothing sales were up 10%. Women?s wear, men?s wear and lingerie all showed gains for the period. Despite the introduction of the David Beckham-branded clothes for children?s, the children?s wear segment proved disappointing for the company. But the adult wear collection showed strong year-on-year sales performance.

Marks & Spencer, which released the first quarter figures in July 2003, could interpret its core clothing business as showing a loss of market share. M&S?s growth stalled in the final quarter of 2002, and many had been hoping that the first quarter would see a resumption of expansion. But overall, it posted a 5.4% jump in the first quarter sales.

In 2003, Marks & Spencer had over 300 stores located throughout the UK, providing nearly 12.5million square feet of sales space. That included their largest store at Marble Arch, London, which had around 170.000 square feet of sales floor. In addition, the Company had 150 stores worldwide, including over 130 franchise businesses, operating in 27 countries. At the same time Marks & Spencer had more than 600 retail and franchise operations in Central Europe, North America, and Asia.

Future outlook
Skeptics argue that M&S has been benefiting largely on the strength of consumer spending. They point out that registering a 30 per cent gain in pre-tax profits in FY02 is not especially impressive, when figures in FY02 were exceptionally low at just ?480 million (in 1998 that figure stood at ?1.2 billion). Kim Warren, of London Business School is concerned, when he said at that time, ?Rationalizing businesses, that never stood a chance to build sufficient resources to deliver sustainable self-generating earnings, clearly made sense. The new product ranges are brining new customers, but these are different from M&S traditional types of consumers, and their behavior is most likely to differ strongly, which poses risks for the sustainability of the recovery.?

Critics also point out that increased competition from the likes of Next, Dehenhams, is likely to see margins across the whole sector squeezed. But, the disputable point is that the fall of M&S is as its own doing as it is the competition?s. While there had been successes like the Pre Una, there had also been slip-ups like the ?autograph? range. The Autograph range of clothing was designed by leading names in fashion and priced accordingly, but was only branded with the M&S label, rather than having the designer?s names on them. What M&S failed to comprehend was that the premium on the premium on the clothes was in lieu of its designers and not its brand name. Another potential slip-up could be the recently announced plans to expend its interests in home furnishings, seeking to set itself in a niche somewhere between Swedish flatpack giant IKEA and upmarket department store rival John Lewis. That seems like a return to its expansionist thinking of the past.

Judi Bevan, in her book ?The Rise and Fall of Marks & Spencer? voiced similar concerns. She said that the company had doe well, but it?s going to get tougher from now on. M&S are going to have to fight every season and can?t just sail along.

Along with the external pressures, Bevan also believed tensions in the boardroom could possibly knock the firm a little bit off the course. There had been a power feud going on between Vandevelde and the Heir apparent Roger Holmes, which was reminiscent of the days of Sir Richard and Salsbury.
Exhibit 1
Summary of profit and loss account
52 weeks ended 29 march ?03 52 weeks ended 30 march ?02
Continuing discont cont disctd
Operations operations total Ops Ops total
?m ?m ?m ?m ?m ?m
Turnover 8007.2 – 8077.2 7619.4 516.0 8135.4
Operating profit;
Before exceptional operating charges
Exceptional operating charges

761.8
(43.9) –

761.8
43.9
269.1

14.7

643.8

Total 717.9 – 717.9 269.1 14.7 643.8
Profit on sale of property and other fixed assets
Loss on sale/termination of operations
Net interest(expense)/income 1.6

(40.5) –
(1.5)
– 1.6
1.5
40.5 41.2

17.9 –
366.7
– 41.2
366.7
17.6
Profit/(loss) on ordinary activities before taxation 679.0 1.5 43.8 42.1 366.7 325.5
Analyzed between:
Profit on ordinary activities before taxation and exceptional items
Exceptional items

721.3
(42.3)


1.5

721.3
43.8

646.7
41.2

14.7
66.7

641.4
0.4
Taxation on ordinary activities 197.4 – 197.4 195.1 12.6 182.5
Profit/(loss) on ordinary activities after taxation
Minority interests (all equity) 481.6
0.4 1.5
– 480.1
0.4 492.8
1.1 339.4
1.5 152.4
0.4
Profit/(loss) attributable to shareholders
Dividends (including dividends un respect of non-
equity share) 482.0

246.0 1.5

– 480.5

264.0 493.9

283.9 340.9 153.0

238.9
Retained profit/(loss) for the period 236.0 1.5 234.5 255.0 340.9 85.9
Earning per share
Adjusted earnings per share
Dividend per share 20.7p
22.2p 20.7p
22.2p
10,.5p 17.4p
15.9p 5.4p
16.3p
9.5p
 

 

Notes to the summary of profit and loss account
2003 2006
?m ?m
Turnover from continuing operations
UK Retail
International Retail
Financial Services
7066.0
681.3
329.9
6575.2
693.4
350.8
Total 8.77.2 7619.4
Turnover from continuing operations
UK Retail
International Retail
Financial Services
Excess interest charged within Financial Services
631.9
43.5
86.4

505.2
33.3
84.2
6.4
Total operating profit (before exceptional items) 761.8 629.1
Source: www.marksandspencer.com

Exhibit 11
Summary of sales performance
% Increase/(decrease) on last year 14 weeks to
6 July 12 weeks to
28 Sep 15 weeks to
11 Jan 11 weeks to
29 March 52 weeks to
29 March
Clothing, footwear&gifts
Home
Foods 14.8
5.9
2.9 13.8
15.1
7.5 9.8
5.0
5.7 (0.3)
9.3
6.4 10.0
8.0
5.1
Total 9.1 11.1 8.0 2.4 7.8
Source: www.marksandspencer.com
 

 

 

 

 

Exhibit 111
Summary of balance sheet
At 29 march 2003
2003 2006
?m ?m
Fixed assets
Tangible assets
Investment
3435.1
31.5
3381.2
50.3
3466.6 3431.5
Current assets
Stocks
Debtors
Cash and investments
361.8
2455.4
479.1
325.3
2619.3
816.1

Current liabilities
Creditors: amounts falling due within one year 3289.1

1678.9 3760.7

1750.8
Net current assets 1810.2 2009.9
Total assets less current liabilities

Creditors: amounts falling due after more one year
Provisions for liabilities and charges 5076.8

1810.0
228.4 5441.4

2156.3
203.8
Net assets 3038.4 3081.3
Shareholders? funds(including non-equity interests)
Minority interests(all equity) 3038.4
– 3080.9
0.4
Total capital employed 3038.4 3081.3
Source: www.marksandspencer.com

Exhibit 1V
Summary of cash flow statement
For the period ending 29 march 2003
2003 2006
?m ?m
Operating activities
Net cash inflow before exceptional items
Exceptional operating cash flows
1180.0
19.3
1123.7
30.0
Cash inflow from operating activities
Dividend received from joint venture
Returns on investments and servicing of finance
Taxation
Capital expenditure and financial investment
Acquisitions and disposals
Equity dividends paid 1168.7
8.0
46.2
216.9
295.2
38.3
225.4 1093.7

36.8
179.4
176.0
161.7
256.7
Cash inflow before funding 254.2 1132.0
Source: www.marksandspencer.com
Exhibit V

2003
52 weeks
?m 2002
52 weeks
?m 2001
52 weeks
?m 2000
52 weeks
?m 1999
52 weeks
?m
Turnover from continuing operations
UK Retail
International Retail
Financial Services
7066.0
681.3
329.9
6575.2
693.4
350.0
6293.5
686.5
363.1
6482.7
636.3
364.8
6601.1
581.2
348.6
Operating profit from continuing operations
(before exceptionals )
UK Retail
International Retail
Financial Services
631.9
43.5
86.4
505.2
33.3
84.2
334.8
41.9
96.3
420.1
24.0
115.9
478.9
14.5
110.7
Profit before tax from continuing operations
Before exceptional items
After exceptional items

712.3
679.0

646.7
687.9

494.8
383.6

574.2
498.1

657.5
638.0
Adjusted earnings per share
Earnings per share
Dividend per share 22.2p
20.7p
10.5p 16.3p
5.4p
9.5p 11.2p
0.2p
9.0p 13.8p
9.6p
9..0p 15.6p
13.0p
14.4p
Balance sheet
Net assets
Net debt
Capital expenditure
3038.4
1831.4
311.0
3081.3
1907.0
290.5
4581.4
1277.8
255.7
4849.0
1251.4
450.6
4806.6
1181.6
683.1
UK Retail footage(xx sq ft)
International Retail footage(xx sq ft) 12349
948 12229
955 12440
954 12265
951 11960
916
Staffing(full-time equivalent)
UK Retail
International Retail
Financial Services
43108
3363
1285
40854
3759
1368
41573
3537
1363
41699
3419
1252
40814
3740
1070
Source: www.marksandspencer.com
Exhibit V1
Exhibit V11
Shareholder?s Return

Exhibit V111
Board of directors:
Executive directors
Luc vandevelde?chairman
Roger Holmes?chief executive
Alison reed?executive director, finance
David Norgrove?executive director, clothing & international
Laurel Powers-Freeling?executive director, Financial Services
Justin King– executive director, food
Vittorio Radice?executive director, home
Non-Executive Director and Company Secretary

Brain Baldock CBE?Non-Executive Director
Kevin Lomax?Executive Director
Dame Stella Rimington DCB?Non-Executive Director
Jack Keenan?Non-Executive Director
Paul miners?Non-Executive Director
Graham Oakley?Group Secretary and Chief Legal Advisor

Exhibit 1X
Profiles:
Luc vandevelde?chairman
Age 51. Appointed in February 2000. Previously. Chairman and CEO of Promodes, which he joined in 1995. During that time he built Promodes into an international retailer with operations across Europe, Asia and South America and merged Promodes with Carrefour in 1999. Chairman of ECR Europe. Luc was born in Belgium and has spent most of his career working internationally, including 24 years with Kraft where he finished as CEO of the French and Italian operations.
Roger Holmes?Chief Executive
Age 42. Joined Marks & Spencer in January 2001 as Managing Director: UK Retail and was appointed Chief Executive in September 2002. He joined the company from kingfisher where he was Chief Executive of the Electrical Sector and a m

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