icon

Usetutoringspotscode to get 8% OFF on your first order!

Questions on Voting

1. Does the following family of preferences over the three alternatives X, Y, Z have the single-peak
property? Explain. There are four preference orderings, each represented by a column, and a
higher alternative is preferred to a lower one.
X Z Z Y
Z X Y Z
Y Y X X
2. Suppose that an odd number of individuals have single-peak preferences. Explain why the mostpreferred
alternative of the median voter will defeat every other proposal by a majority votes.
3. Consider majority rule with six people. Because there is an even number of individuals there is a
possibility of ties. We will say that a is a unique majority winner if there is no feasible alternative
that defeats a by a majority, and for every other feasible alternative ß there is at least one other
feasible alternative that defeats ß by some majority. Use Tables 1 and 2 to show that the rule
that selects the unique majority winner can be manipulated by a single individual.
Table 1
Person 1 Person 2 Person 3 Person 4 Person 5 Person 6
X X W Y Z Z
Y W Y Z X W
Z Y X W W Y
W Z Z X Y X
Table 2
Person 1 Person 2 Person 3 Person 4 Person 5 Person 6
X X Y Y Z Z
Y W Z Z X W
Z Y W W W Y
W Z X X Y X

Responses are currently closed, but you can trackback from your own site.

Comments are closed.

Questions on Voting

1. Does the following family of preferences over the three alternatives X, Y, Z have the single-peak
property? Explain. There are four preference orderings, each represented by a column, and a
higher alternative is preferred to a lower one.
X Z Z Y
Z X Y Z
Y Y X X
2. Suppose that an odd number of individuals have single-peak preferences. Explain why the mostpreferred
alternative of the median voter will defeat every other proposal by a majority votes.
3. Consider majority rule with six people. Because there is an even number of individuals there is a
possibility of ties. We will say that a is a unique majority winner if there is no feasible alternative
that defeats a by a majority, and for every other feasible alternative ß there is at least one other
feasible alternative that defeats ß by some majority. Use Tables 1 and 2 to show that the rule
that selects the unique majority winner can be manipulated by a single individual.
Table 1
Person 1 Person 2 Person 3 Person 4 Person 5 Person 6
X X W Y Z Z
Y W Y Z X W
Z Y X W W Y
W Z Z X Y X
Table 2
Person 1 Person 2 Person 3 Person 4 Person 5 Person 6
X X Y Y Z Z
Y W Z Z X W
Z Y W W W Y
W Z X X Y X

Responses are currently closed, but you can trackback from your own site.

Comments are closed.

Powered by WordPress | Designed by: Premium WordPress Themes | Thanks to Themes Gallery, Bromoney and Wordpress Themes