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Topic: Hume
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Discuss the form(s) of “sympathy” found in Book II of the Treatise. What is the difference between the ‘principle’ of sympathy, and ‘sympathy’ as an imaginative exercise? What does sympathy give Hume, in terms of the explanatory force of his philosophical psychology? Why, according to Hume, is sympathy commonly “highly variable”? Why is “extensive sympathy”—which gives rise to moral approbation and disapprobation—not variable in this problematic way, according to Hume?
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A Treatise of Human Nature
Book II: OF THE PASSIONS
Part I : OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY
Part II .: OF LOVE AND HATRED
Part III: OF THE WILL AND DIRECT PASSIONS
PART I
Of pride and humility
SECT. I
Division of the subject
As all the perceptions of the mind may be divided into impressions and ideas, so the impressions admit of
another division into original and secondary. This division of the impressions is the same with that which
(1)
I formerly made use of when I distinguish’d them into impressions of sensation and reflection. Original
impressions or impressions of sensation are such as without any antecedent perception arise in the soul,
from the constitution of the body, from the animal spirits, or from the application of objects to the external
organs. Secondary, or reflective impressions are such as proceed from some of these original ones, either
immediately or by the interposition of its idea. Of the first kind are all the impressions of the senses, and all
bodily pains and pleasures: Of the second are the passions, and other emotions resembling them.
Tis certain, that the mind, in its perceptions, must begin somewhere; and that since the impressions precede
their correspondent ideas, there must be some impressions, which without any introduction make their
appearance in the soul. As these depend upon natural and physical causes, the examination of them wou’d
lead me too far from my present subject, into the sciences of anatomy and natural philosophy. For this
reason I shall here confine myself to those other impressions, which I have call’d secondary and reflective,
as arising either from the original impressions, or from their ideas. Bodily pains and pleasures are the source
of many passions, both when felt and consider’d by the mind; but arise originally in the soul, or in the body,
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whichever you please to call it, without any preceding thought or perception. A fit of the gout produces a
long train of passions, as grief, hope, fear; but is not deriv’d immediately from any affection or idea. The
reflective impressions may be divided into two kinds, viz. the calm and the violent . Of the first kind is the
sense of beauty and deformity in action, composition, and external objects. Of the second are the passions
of love and hatred, grief and joy, pride and humility. This division is far from being exact. The raptures of
poetry and music frequently rise to the greatest height; while those other impressions, properly call’d
passions, may decay into so soft an emotion, as to become, in a manner, imperceptible. But as in general the
passions are more violent than the emotions arising from beauty and deformity, these impressions have been
commonly distinguish’d from each other. The subject of the human mind being so copious and various, I
shall here take advantage of this vulgar and spacious division, that I may proceed with the greater order; and
having said ali I thought necessary concerning our ideas, shall now explain those violent emotions or
passions, their nature, origin, causes, and effects.
When we take a survey of the passions, there occurs a division of them into direct and indirect. By direct
passions I understand such as arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure. By indirect such
as proceed from the same principles, but by the conjunction of other qualities. This distinction I cannot at
present justify or explain any farther. I can only observe in general, that under the indirect passions I
comprehend pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, with their
dependants. And under the direct passions, desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and security. I
shall begin with the former.
SECT. II
Of pride and humility; their objects and causes
The passions of PRIDE and HUMILITY being simple and uniform impressions, `tis impossible we can
ever, by a multitude of words, give a just definition of them, or indeed of any of the passions. The utmost
we can pretend to is a description of them, by an enumeration of such circumstances, as attend them: But as
these words, pride and humility, are of general use, and the impressions they represent the most common of
any, every one, of himself, will be able to form a just idea of them, without any danger of mistake. For
which reason, not to lose time upon preliminaries, I shall immediately enter upon the examination of these
passions.
`Tis evident, that pride and humility, tho’ directly contrary, have yet the same OBJECT. This object is self,
or that succession of related ideas and impressions, of which we have an intimate memory and
consciousness. `Here the view always fixes when we are actuated by either of these passions. According as
our idea of ourself is more or less advantageous, we feel either of those opposite affections, and are elated
by pride, or dejected with humility. Whatever other objects may be comprehended by the mind, they are
always consider’d with a view to ourselves; otherwise they would never be able either to excite these
passions, or produce the smallest encrease or diminution of them. When self enters not into the
consideration, there is no room either for pride or humility.
But tho’ that connected succession of perceptions, which we call self , be always the object of these two
passions, `tis impossible it can be their CAUSE, or be sufficient alone to excite them. For as these passions
are directly contrary, and have the same object in common; were their object also their cause; it cou’d never
produce any degree of the one passion, but at the same time it must excite an equal degree of the other;
which opposition and contrariety must destroy both. Tis impossible a man can at the same time be both
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proud and humble; and where he has different reasons for these passions, as frequently happens, the
passions either take place alternately; or if they encounter, the one annihilates the other, as far as its strength
goes, and the remainder only of that, which is superior, continues to operate upon the mind. But in the
present case neither of the passions cou’d ever become superior; because supposing it to be the view only of
ourself, which excited them, that being perfectly indifferent to either, must produce both in the very same
proportion; or in other words, can produce neither. To excite any passion, and at’ the same time raise an
equal share of its antagonist, is immediately to undo what was done, and must leave the mind at last
perfectly calm and indifferent.
We must therefore, make a distinction betwixt the cause and the object of these passions; betwixt that idea,
which excites them, and that to which they direct their view, when excited. Pride and humility, being once
rais’d, immediately turn our attention to ourself, and regard that as their ultimate and final object; but there is
something farther requisite in order to raise them: Something, which is peculiar to one of the passions, and
produces not both in the very same degree. The first idea, that is presented to the mind, is that of the cause
or productive principle. This excites the passion, connected with it; and that passion, when excited. turns our
view to another idea, which is that of self. Here then is a passion plac’d betwixt two ideas, of which the one
produces it, and the other is produc’d by it. The first idea, therefore, represents the cause, the second the
object of the passion.
To begin with the causes of pride and humility; we may observe, that their most obvious and remarkable
property is the vast variety of subjects, on which they may be plac’d. Every valuable quality of the mind,
whether of the imagination, judgment, memory or disposition; wit, good-sense, learning, courage, justice,
integrity; all these are the cause of pride; and their opposites of humility. Nor are these passions confin’d to
the mind but extend their view to the body likewise. A man may he proud of his beauty, strength, agility,
good mein, address in dancing, riding, and of his dexterity in any manual business or manufacture. But this
is not all. The passions looking farther, comprehend whatever objects are in the least ally’d or related to us.
Our country, family, children, relations, riches, houses, gardens, horses, dogs, cloaths; any of these may
become a cause either of pride or of humility.
From the consideration of these causes, it appears necessary we shoud make a new distinction in the causes
of the passion, betwixt that quality , which operates, and the subject, on which it is plac’d. A man, for
instance, is vain of a beautiful house, which belongs to him, or which he has himself built and contriv’d.
Here the object of the passion is himself, and the cause is the beautiful house: Which cause again is sub-divided into two parts, viz. the quality, which operates upon the passion, and the subject in which the quality
inheres. The quality is the beauty, and the subject is the house, consider’d as his property or contrivance.
Both these parts are essential, nor is the distinction vain and chimerical. Beauty, consider’d merely as such,
unless plac’d upon something related to us, never produces any pride or vanity; and the strongest. relation
alone, without beauty, or something else in its place, has as little influence on that passion. Since, therefore,
these two particulars are easily separated and there is a necessity for their conjunction, in order to produce
the passion, we ought to consider them as component parts of the cause; and infix in our minds an exact
idea of this distinction.
SECT. III
Whence these objects and causes are deriv’d
Being so far advanc’d as to observe a difference betwixt the object of the passions and their cause, and to
distinguish in the cause the quality, which operates on the passions, from the subject, in which it inheres; we
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now proceed to examine what determines each of them to be what it is, and assigns such a particular object,
and quality, and subject to these affections. By this means we shall fully understand the origin of pride and
humility.
`Tis evident in the first place, that these passions are derermin’d to have self for their object, not only by a
natural but also by an original property. No one can doubt but this property is natural from the constancy
and steadiness of its operations. Tis always self, which is the object of pride and humility; and whenever the
passions look beyond, `tis still with a view to ourselves, nor can any person or object otherwise have any
influence upon us.
That this proceeds from an original quality or primary impulse, will likewise appear evident, if we consider
that `tis the distinguishing characteristic of these passions Unless nature had given some original qualities to
the mind, it cou’d never have any secondary ones; because in that case it wou’d have no foundation for
action, nor cou’d ever begin to exert itself. Now these qualities, which we must consider as original, are
such as are most inseparable from the soul, and can be resolv’d into no other: And such is the quality, which
determines the object of pride and humility. We may, perhaps, make it a greater question, whether the
causes, that produce the passion, be as natural as the object, to which it is directed, and whether all that vast
variety proceeds from caprice or from the constitution of the mind. This doubt we shall soon remove, if we
cast our eye upon human nature, and consider that in all nations and ages, the same objects still give rise to
pride and humility; and that upon the view even of a stranger, we can know pretty nearly, what will either
encrease or diminish his passions of this kind. If there be any variation in this particular, it proceeds from
nothing but a difference in the tempers and complexions of men; and is besides very inconsiderable. Can we
imagine it possible, that while human nature remains the same, men will ever become entirely indifferent to
their power, riches, beauty or personal merit, and that their pride and vanity will not be affected by these
advantages?
But tho’ the causes of pride and humility be plainly natural, we shall find upon examination, that they are
not original, and that `tis utterly impossible they shou’d each of them be adapted to these passions by a
particular provision, and primary constitution of nature, Beside their prodigious number, many of them are
the effects of art, and arise partly from the industry, partly from the caprice, and partly from the good
fortune of men, Industry produces houses, furniture, cloaths. Caprice determines their particular kinds and
qualities. And good fortune frequently contributes to all this, by discovering the effects that result from the
different mixtures and combinations of bodies. Tis absurd, therefore, to imagine, that each of these was
foreseen and provided for by nature, and that every new production of art, which causes pride or humility;
instead of adapting itself to the passion by partaking of some general quality, that naturally operates on the
mind; is itself the object of an original principle, which till then lay conceal’d in the soul, and is only by
accident at last brought to light. Thus the first mechanic, that invented a fine scritoire, produc’d pride in him,
who became possest of it, by principles different from those, which made him proud of handsome chairs
and tables. As this appears evidently ridiculous, we must conclude, that each cause of pride and humility is
not adapted to the passions by a distinct original quality; but that there are some one or more circumstances
common to all of them, on which their efficacy depends.
Besides, we find in the course of nature, that tho’ the effects be many, the principles, from which they arise,
are commonly but few and simple, and that `tis the sign of an unskilful naturalist to have recourse to a
different quality, in order to explain every different operation. How much more must this be true with
regard to the human mind, which being so confin’d a subject may justly be thought incapable of containing
such a monstrous heap of principles, as wou d be necessary to excite the passions of pride and humility,
were each distinct cause adapted to the passion by a distinct set of principles?
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Here, therefore, moral philosophy is in the same condition as natural, with regard to astronomy before the
time of Copernicus. The antients, tho’ sensible of that maxim, that nature does nothing in vain , contriv’d
such intricate systems of the heavens, as seem’d inconsistent with true philosophy, and gave place at last to
something more simple and natural. To invent without scruple a new principle to every new phaenomenon,
instead of adapting it to the old; to overload our hypotheses with a variety of this kind; are certain proofs,
that none of these principles is the just one, and that we only desire, by a number of falsehoods, to cover our
ignorance of the truth.
SECT. IV
Of the relations of impressions and ideas
Thus we have establish’d two truths without any obstacle or difficulty, that ` tis from natural principles this
variety of causes excites pride and humility , and that `tis not by a different principle each different cause is
adapted to its passion . We shall now proceed to enquire how we may reduce these principles to a lesser
number, and find among the causes something common, on which their influence depends.
In order to this we must reflect on certain properties of human nature, which tho’ they have a mighty
influence on every operation both of the understanding and passions, are not commonly much insisted on by
philosophers. The first of these is the association of ideas, which I have so often observ’d and explain’d. Tis
impossible for the mind to fix itself steadily upon one idea for any considerable time; nor can it by its
utmost efforts ever arrive at such a constancy. But however changeable our thoughts may be, they are not
entirely without rule and method in their changes. The rule, by which they proceed, is to pass from one
object to what is resembling, contiguous to, or produc’d by it. When one idea is present to the imagination,
any other, united by these relations, naturally follows it, and enters with more facility by means of that
introduction.
The second property I shall observe in the human mind is a like association of impressions. All resembling
impressions are connected together, and no sooner one arises than the `rest immediately follow. Grief and
disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole
circle be compleated. In like manner our temper, when elevated with joy, naturally throws itself into love,
generosity, pity, courage, pride, and the other resembling affections. `Tis difficult for the mind, when
actuated by any passion, to confine itself to that passion alone, without any change or variation. Human
nature is too inconstant to admit of any such regularity. Changeableness is essential to it. And to what can it
so naturally change as to affections or emotions, which are suitable to the temper, and agree with that set of
passions, which then prevail? `Tis evident, then, there is an attraction or association among impressions, as
well as among ideas; tho’ with this remarkable difference, that ideas are associated by resemblance,
contiguity, and causation; and impressions only by resemblance.
In the third place, `tis observable of these two kinds of association, that they very much assist and forward
each other, and that the transition is more easily made where they both concur in the same object. Thus a
man, who, by any injury from another, is very much discompos’d and ruffled in his temper, is apt to find a
hundred subjects of discontent, impatience, fear, and other uneasy passions; especially if he can discover
these subjects in or near the person, who was the cause of his first passion. Those principles, which forward
the transition of ideas, here concur with those, which operate on the passions; and both uniting in one
action, bestow on the mind a double impulse. The new passion, therefore, must arise with so much greater
violence, and the transition to it must be render’d so much more easy and natural.
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Upon this occasion I may cite the authority of an elegant writer, who expresses himself in the following
manner.
`As the fancy delights in every thing that is great, strange, or beautiful, and is still more pleas’d the more it
finds of these perfections in the same object, so it is capable of receiving a new satisfaction by the assistance
of another sense. Thus any continu’d sound, as the music of birds, or a fall of waters, awakens every
moment the mind of the beholder, and makes him more attentive to the several beauties of the place, that lie
before him. Thus if there arises a fragrancy of smells or perfumes, they heighten the pleasure of the
imagination, and make even the colours and verdure of the landschape appear more agreeable; for the ideas
of both senses recommend each other, and are pleasanter together than when they enter the mind separately:
As the different colours of a picture, when they are well disposed, set off one another, and receive an
additional beauty from the advantage of the situation.'[ Addison, Spectator 412, final paragraph.]
In this phaenomenon we may remark the association both of impressions and ideas, as well as the mutual
assistance they lend each other.
SECT. V
Of the influence of these relations on pride and humility
These principles being establish’d on unquestionable experience, I begin to consider how we shall apply
them, by revolving over all the causes of pride and humility, whether these causes be regarded, as the
qualities, that operate, or as the subjects, on which the qualities are plac’d. In examining these qualities I
immediately find many of them to concur in producing the sensation of pain and pleasure, independent of
those affections, which I here endeavour to explain. Thus the beauty of our person, of itself, and by its very
appearance, gives pleasure, as well as pride; and its deformity, pain as well as humility. A magnificent feast
delights us, and a sordid one displeases. What I discover to be true in some instances, I suppose to be so in
all; and take it for granted at present, without any farther proof, that every cause of pride, by its peculiar
qualities, produces a separate pleasure, and of humility a separate uneasiness.
Again, in considering the subjects, to which these qualities adhere, I make a new supposition, which also
appears probable from many obvious instances, viz, that these subjects are either parts of ourselves, or
something nearly related to us. Thus the good and bad qualities of our actions and manners constitute virtue
and vice, and determine our personal character, than which nothing operates more strongly on these
passions. In like manner, `tis the beauty or deformity of our person, houses, equipage, or furniture, by which
we are render’d either vain or humble. The same qualities, when transfer’d to subjects, which bear us no
relation, influence not in the smallest degree either of these affections.
Having thus in a manner suppos’d two properties of the causes of these affections, viz, that the qualities
produce a separate pain or pleasure, and that the subjects, on which the qualities are plac’d, are related to
self; I proceed to examine the passions themselves, in order to find something in them, correspondent ro the
suppos’d properties of their causes. First, I find, that the peculiar object of pride and humility is determin’d
by an original and natural instinct, and that `tis absolutely impossible, from the primary constitution of the
mind, that these passions shou’d ever look beyond self, or that individual person. of whose actions and
sentiments each of us is intimately conscious. Here at last the view always rests, when we are actuated by
either of these passions; nor can we, in that situation of mind, ever lose sight of this object. For this I
pretend not to give any reason; but consider such a peculiar direction of the thought as an original quality.
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The second quality, which I discover in these passions, and which I likewise consider an an original quality,
is their sensations, or the peculiar emotions they excite in the soul, and which constitute their very being
and essence. Thus pride is a pleasant sensation, and humility a painful; and upon the removal of the pleasure
and pain, there is in reality no pride nor humility. Of this our very feeling convinces us; and beyond our
feeling, `tis here in vain to reason or dispute.
If I compare, therefore, these two establish’d properties of the passions, viz, their object, which is self, and
their sensation, which is either pleasant or painful, to the two suppos’d properties of the causes, viz, their
relation to self, and their tendency to produce a pain or pleasure, independent of the passion; I immediately
find, that taking these suppositions to be just, the true system breaks in upon me with an irresistible
evidence. That cause, which excites the passion, is related to the object, which nature has attributed to the
passion; the sensation, which the cause separately produces, is related to the sensation of the passion: From
this double relation of ideas and impressions, the passion is deriv’d. The one idea is easily converted into its
correlative; and the one impression into that, which resembles and corresponds to it: With how much greater
facility must this transition be made, where these movements mutually assist each other, and the mind
receives a double impulse from the relations both of its impressions and ideas?
That we may comprehend this the better, we must suppose, that nature has given to the organs of the human
mind, a certain disposition fitted to produce a peculiar impression or emotion, which we call pride: To this
emotion she has assign’d a certain idea, viz, that of self, which it never fails to produce. This contrivance of
nature is easily conceiv’d. We have many instances of such a situation of affairs. The nerves of the nose and
palate are so dispos’d, as in certain circumstances to convey such peculiar sensations to the mind: The
sensations of lust and hunger always produce in us the idea of those peculiar objects, which are suitable to
each appetite. These two circumstances are united in pride. The organs are so dispos’d as to produce the
passion; and the passion, after its production, naturally produces a certain idea. All this needs no proof. `Tis
evident we never shou’d be possest of that passion, were there not a disposition of mind proper for it; and
`tis as evident, that the passion always turns our view to ourselves, and makes us think of our own qualities
and circumstances.
This being fully comprehended, it may now be ask’d, Whether nature produces the passion immediately, of
herself; or whether she must be assisted by the co-operation of other causes ? For `tis observable, that in
this particular her conduct is different in the different passions and sensations. The palate must be excited
by an external object, in order to produce any relish: But hunger arises internally, without the concurrence
of any external object. But however the case may stand with other passions and impressions, `tis certain,
that pride requires the assistance of some foreign object, and that the organs, which produce it, exert not
themselves like the heart and arteries, by an original internal movement. For first, daily experience
convinces us, that pride requires certain causes to excite it, and languishes when unsupported by some
excellency in the character, in bodily accomplishments, in cloaths, equipage or fortune. Secondly , `tis
evident pride wou’d be perpetual, if it arose immediately from nature; since the object is always the same,
and there is no disposition of body peculiar to pride, as there is to thirst and hunger. Thirdly, Humility is in
the very same situation with pride; and therefore, either must, upon this supposition, be perpetual likewise,
or must destroy the contrary passion from, the very first moment; so that none of them cou’d ever make its
appearance. Upon the whole, we may rest satisfy’d with the foregoing conclusion, that pride must have a
cause, as well as an object, and that the one has no influence without the other.
The difficulty, then, is only to discover this cause, and find what it is that gives the first motion to pride, and
sets those organs in action, which are naturally fitted to produce that emotion. Upon my consulting
experience, in order to resolve this difficulty, I immediately find a hundred different causes, that produce
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pride; and upon examining these causes, I suppose, what at first I perceive to be probable, that all of them
concur in two circumstances; which are, that of themselves they produce an impression, ally’d to the
passion, and are plac’d on a subject, ally’d to the object of the passion. When I consider after this the nature
of relation, and its effects both on the passions and ideas, I can no longer doubt, upon these suppositions,
that `tis the very principle, which gives rise to pride, and bestows motion on those organs, which being
naturally dispos’d to produce that affection, require only a first impulse or beginning to their action. Any
thing, that gives a pleasant sensation, and is related to self, excites the passion of pride, which is also
agreeable, and has self for its object.
What I have said of pride is equally true of humility. The sensation of humility is uneasy, as that of pride is
agreeable; for which reason the separate sensation, arising from the causes, must be revers’d, while the
relation to self continues the same. Tho’ pride and humility are directly contrary in their effects, and in their
sensations, they have notwithstanding the same object; so that `tis requisite only to change the relation of
impressions, without making any change upon that of ideas. Accordingly we find, that a beautiful house,
belonging to ourselves, produces pride; and that the same house, still belonging to ourselves, produces
humility, when by any accident its beauty is chang’d into deformity, and thereby the sensation of pleasure,
which corresponded to pride, is transform’d into pain, which is related to humility. The double relation
between the ideas and impressions subsists in both cases, and produces an easy transition from the one
emotion to the other.
In a word, nature has bestow’d a kind of attraction on certain impressions and ideas, by which one of them,
upon its appearance, naturally introduces its correlative. If these two attractions or associations of
impressions and ideas concur on the same object, they mutually assist each other, and the transition of the
affections and of the imagination is made with the greatest ease and facility. When an idea produces an
impression, related to an impression, which is connected with an idea, related to the first idea, these two
impressions must be in a manner inseparable, nor will the one in any case be unattended with the other. `Tis
after this manner, that the particular causes of pride and humility are determin’d. The quality, which operates
on the passion, produces separately an impression resembling it; the subject, to which the quality adheres, is
related to self, the object of the passion: No wonder the whole cause, consisting of a quality and of a
subject, does so unavoidably give rise to the pass on.
To illustrate this hypothesis. we may compare it to that, by which I have already explain’d the belief
attending the judgments, which we form from causation. I have observ’d, that in all judgments of this kind,
there is always a present impression. and a related idea; and that the present impression gives a vivacity to
the fancy, and the relation conveys this vivacity, by an easy transition, to the related idea. Without the
present impression, the attention is not fix’d, nor t
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