Econ 402.2 Spring 2016
Homework 2 Due at the beginning of class, Tuesday, February 16
1. For each of the following two nonzero-sum games, is the game strategically equivalent
to a ZSG? If your answer is “YES,” give a strategically equivalent ZSG and show why it
is strategically equivalent. If your answer is “NO,” explain why not.
a) (2 points)
L R
U 4, -2 0, 0
D -2, 1 6, -3
b) (2 points)
L R
U -1, 2 4, 4
D -2, 0 3, 2
2. (3 points) For the following game, a mixed strategy (s2(L), 1 – s2(L), 0) dominates R
if a < s2(L) < b.
L C R
U 8, 6 0, 2 8, 3
D 1, 0 2, 6 5, 1
Find a and b. Show your work clearly.
3. (3 points) For the following game, R is a best response to a belief (?1(U), 1 – ?1(U)) if
a = ?1(U) = b.
L C R
U 8, 6 0, 2 8, 5
D 1, 0 2, 6 5, 3
Find a and b. Show your work clearly.
4. (5 points) Problem 4 on page 75 of the text.
5. (5 points) Problem 7 on page 76 of the text.

Econ 402.2 Spring 2016
Homework 2 Due at the beginning of class, Tuesday, February 16
1. For each of the following two nonzero-sum games, is the game strategically equivalent
to a ZSG? If your answer is “YES,” give a strategically equivalent ZSG and show why it
is strategically equivalent. If your answer is “NO,” explain why not.
a) (2 points)
L R
U 4, -2 0, 0
D -2, 1 6, -3
b) (2 points)
L R
U -1, 2 4, 4
D -2, 0 3, 2
2. (3 points) For the following game, a mixed strategy (s2(L), 1 – s2(L), 0) dominates R
if a < s2(L) < b.
L C R
U 8, 6 0, 2 8, 3
D 1, 0 2, 6 5, 1
Find a and b. Show your work clearly.
3. (3 points) For the following game, R is a best response to a belief (?1(U), 1 – ?1(U)) if
a = ?1(U) = b.
L C R
U 8, 6 0, 2 8, 5
D 1, 0 2, 6 5, 3
Find a and b. Show your work clearly.
4. (5 points) Problem 4 on page 75 of the text.
5. (5 points) Problem 7 on page 76 of the text.

Econ 402.2 Spring 2016
Homework 2 Due at the beginning of class, Tuesday, February 16
1. For each of the following two nonzero-sum games, is the game strategically equivalent
to a ZSG? If your answer is “YES,” give a strategically equivalent ZSG and show why it
is strategically equivalent. If your answer is “NO,” explain why not.
a) (2 points)
L R
U 4, -2 0, 0
D -2, 1 6, -3
b) (2 points)
L R
U -1, 2 4, 4
D -2, 0 3, 2
2. (3 points) For the following game, a mixed strategy (s2(L), 1 – s2(L), 0) dominates R
if a < s2(L) < b.
L C R
U 8, 6 0, 2 8, 3
D 1, 0 2, 6 5, 1
Find a and b. Show your work clearly.
3. (3 points) For the following game, R is a best response to a belief (?1(U), 1 – ?1(U)) if
a = ?1(U) = b.
L C R
U 8, 6 0, 2 8, 5
D 1, 0 2, 6 5, 3
Find a and b. Show your work clearly.
4. (5 points) Problem 4 on page 75 of the text.
5. (5 points) Problem 7 on page 76 of the text.